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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Plaintiff/Appellant Christ Black ("Black")
Defendant/Appellee Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate")
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to this appeal. (See Brief of Appellant Black at p. 3.)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is Black's appeal from a judgment and Order of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered in favor of Allstate on
December 19, 2000. Black later proceeded to trial against Allstate's insured, Gallagher,
on March 26 and March 27, 2002, and judgment was entered against Gallagher on April
16. 2002. Thereafter, Black filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to renew his action against Allstate. Black's Rule 59 Motion was
denied on September 4, 2002 and Black filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2002. On
November 5, 2002, Allstate filed a Motion for Summary Disposition with this Court
pursuant to Rule 10(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Allstate's Motion
for Summary Disposition was denied on November 20, 2002. Accordingly, this Court
has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Although an Allstate insured, is Black a third-party claimant in the

context of his claim with Allstate, which is based on the fault of Gallagher who is also an
Allstate insured?

1

2.

Was the District Court's summary judgment with prejudice in favor

of Allstate appropriate because, as a third-party claimant, Black cannot pursue a firstparty claim directly against Allstate?
3.

Is the denial of Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment a final

judgment that should be reviewed by this Court?
Standard of Review. When considering an appeal from summary judgment
granted by a district court, including the conclusion that there are no material factual
issues, an appellate court gives no deference to the district court's conclusions of law,
which are reviewed for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d
1108 (Utah 1991); Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193
(Utah Ct. Appeals 1992).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Reference to the following case law will assist the Court in resolving the
issues presented.
Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999)
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967)
Pixton v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter arises from an automobile accident that occurred between Black
and Gallagher on April 12, 1996. As a result of the accident Black sustained
approximately $4,000 in property damages to his vehicle. (R. at 396-397.) After the
accident Black submitted a claim to Allstate, who insured both Black and Gallagher.
Allstate denied Black's claim and on December 31, 1998 Black brought action against
Gallagher and Allstate. In his Complaint Black asserted that Gallagher was responsible
for the accident. Black also alleged that because Gallagher was at fault for the accident,
Allstate had a duty to settle with Black. (R. at 1-5.)
On January 27, 2000, Allstate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
asserting that by the Allstate insurance policy, Black could not pursue a claim against
directly Allstate to force it to settle with him. (R. at 22 - 27.) Black filed a Memorandum
in Opposition to Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment in which he acknowledged
that his action against Allstate was first-party in nature, but that it was based on his
conclusion that Gallagher was primarily at fault for the accident. He asserted, however,
that in spite of insurance contract language to the contrary, he should be allowed to
pursue a direct action against Allstate. (R. at 36 - 43).

3

Before a hearing on Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment was
scheduled, Black filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which he set forth
several facts related to his accident with Gallagher. Black argued that as a result of these
facts, the District Court should determine that Gallagher was at fault for the accident.
Significantly, Black also argued that as a result of Gallagher's fault, Allstate had a duty to
settle Black's claim. (R. at 85 -91.)
In both its reply to Black's Memorandum in Opposition to Allstate's
Motion for Summary Judgment and its Memorandum in Opposition to Black's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Allstate noted that based on the factual statements and
allegations of all of Black's pleadings, Black's claim against Allstate was third-party in
nature and that he therefore could not maintain a first-party action directly against
Allstate, not only by the terms of the insurance contract, but also by well established Utah
law.1 (R. at 52 - 54, 191 - 195.) The District Court agreed. The Court granted Allstate's
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Black's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. The related Order was entered on December 19, 2000. (R. at 333 - 334.)

1

During the pendency of this action this Court's opinion in Speriy v. Sperry, 990
P.2d 381 (Utah 1999), was issued.)
4

A bench trial between Black and Gallagher took place on March 26 and
March 27, 2002, and judgment was entered against Gallagher on April 16. 2002. (R. at
392-397.) The Court found Gallagher to be 100% at fault for the automobile accident
with Black and awarded Black costs, as well $4,050.00 in property damages. Id.
Thereafter, Black filed a motion under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to renew his action against Allstate. Black argued that because
Gallagher had now been found to be exclusively at fault for the accident, Black should be
able to pursue an action directly against Allstate because it had not settled with Black as
Black had previously demanded. (R. at 400 - 407.) Black's Rule 59 Motion was denied
on September 4, 2002 on the basis that plaintiff was a third-party claimant to Allstate in
the context of his accident with Gallagher, and that as such he could not maintain a firstparty claim directly against Allstate. (R. at 435 - 436.) Plaintiff then filed this appeal.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On April 12, 1996, Black and Gallagher were involved in an

automobile accident in which Black sustained approximately $4,000 in property damages
to his vehicle. (R. at 396-397.) The accident occurred at the intersection of 3300 South
and West Temple in Salt Lake City. Gallagher was proceeding southbound on West
Temple. Black was traveling northbound on West Temple. The accident occurred as
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Black turned left onto 3300 South. Both drivers received citations from the police officer
investigating the accident. (R. 197 - 198.)
2.

After the accident, Black submitted a claim to Allstate for his

property damages. Black's claim was based on the assertion that Gallagher was
exclusively at fault for the accident and the demand that as Gallagher's insurer, Allstate
should settle Black's claim. (R. at 249.) Allstate denied Black's claim. (R. at 126.)
3.

On December 31, 1998, Black brought action against Gallagher and

Allstate. In his Complaint, Black asserted that Gallagher was responsible for the
accident. Black also asserted that because Gallagher was at fault for the accident,
Allstate had a duty to settle with Black. (R. at 1-5.) Black argued that Allstate's failure
to agree with Black's liability evaluation, and its failure to pay Black's property damage
claim, amounted to bad faith. Id. The basis for this allegation was that Black was also an
Allstate insured and thus should be treated differently than other third-party claimants.
Id.
4.

On January 27, 2000, Allstate filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

asserting that by the Allstate insurance contract, Black could not pursue a claim directly
against Allstate to force it to settle with him. (R. at 22 - 27.) In his Memorandum in
Opposition to Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment Black acknowledged that his
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action against Allstate was first-party in nature, and that it was based on his conclusion
that Gallagher was primarily at fault for the accident. He asserted, however, that in spite
of insurance contract language to the contrary, he should be allowed to pursue a direct
action against Allstate. (R. at 36 - 43).
5.

Black also submitted his own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

in which he set forth numerous facts related to his accident with Gallagher. He then
asserted that because Gallagher's fault for the accident was so clear, "at least as between
[Black] and Allstate, there should be no issue as to liability for the accident of April 12,
1996," and therefore Allstate should be ordered to pay Black's claim. (R. at 85 - 91.)
6.

In its Reply to Black's Memorandum in Opposition to Allstate's

Motion for Summary Judgment and its Memorandum in Opposition to Black's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment, Allstate reviewed the factual statements and allegations
contained in Black's pleadings. Allstate again argued that by Black's own assertions, the
basis for his claim against Allstate was the negligence of its insured, Gallagher.
Accordingly, Black's claim was third-party in nature and therefore he could not maintain
a first-party action against Allstate, not only by the terms of the insurance contract, but
also by Utah law. (R. at 52 - 54, 191 - 195.)

7

7.

On April 3, 2000 the Court heard oral argument on Allstate's Motion

for Summary Judgment and on Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The
Court granted Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Black's Motion for
Summary Judgment. (R. at 316 - 317.)
8.

Thereafter, Black filed an objection to the Order on Allstate's

Motion for Summary Judgment and on his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Black
argued that the Order should be without prejudice, asserting that he had a right to pursue
a claim directly against Allstate based on a future liability finding against its insured,
Gallagher. (R. at 318 - 319.)
9.

The District Court denied Black's Objection and summary judgment

was entered in favor of Allstate. (R. at 333 - 334.)
10.

Black and Gallagher then proceeded to a bench trial which took

place on March 26 and March 27, 2002. At the conclusion of the trial, judgment was
entered against Gallagher, whom the District Court determined was 100% at fault for the
accident. (R. at 392 - 397.) Black was awarded his costs, as well $4050.00 in property
damages. Id.
11.

Thereafter, Black filed a motion under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure seeking to renew his action against Allstate. Black argued that because
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Gallagher had now been found to be exclusively at fault for the accident, and even though
the judgment had been satisfied, Black should be able to pursue a bad faith action
directly against Allstate for its refusal to settle with Black. (R. at 400 - 407.) Black's
Rule 59 Motion was denied on September 4, 2002 on the basis that Black was a thirdparty claimant to Allstate in the context of his accident with Gallagher, and that as such
he could not maintain a first-party claim directly against Allstate at any time. (R. at 435 436.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

By this Court's holding in Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah

1999), when a claimant and a tortfeasor are both insureds of the same insurer, the
position of the claimant must be evaluated to determine whether the claim is a first-party
claim or a third-party claim. Because Black's claim against Allstate is based on the
negligence of Gallagher, as this Court found in Sperry, Black's claim against Allstate is
third-party in nature and the District Court's determination that Black was a third-party
claimant to Allstate was correct.
2.

Consistent with well-established Utah law, a direct cause of action

against a tortfeasor's insurer by a third-party claimant cannot be maintained even if the
tortfeasor's insurer is also the claimant's insurer.

9

3.

The fact that Black bases his ability to maintain a claim against

Allstate on a finding that Gallagher was at fault for the accident underscores the
conclusion that Black's claim against Allstate is a third-party claim. By this Court's
analysis in Sperry, Black therefore cannot maintain a direct cause of action against
Allstate as a matter of law at any time. Accordingly, the District Court's Order granting
Allstate summary judgment with prejudice was proper.
4.

The denial of Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is not a

final judgment. Furthermore, as Black himself acknowledges, the bench trial decision
rendered the issue of fault for the automobile accident between Black and Gallagher
moot. Accordingly, this Court should not address the denial of Black's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BLACK IS A THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS CLAIM
WITH ALLSTATE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE FAULT OF ALLSTATE'S
INSURED, GALLAGHER.
Over the course of several years Utah appellate courts have explained the
distinction between first-party and third-party insurance claims. In the first-party context,
duties that are imposed on the insured and the insurer are based upon their insurance
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contract, and thus any action by the insured against the insurer is contractual in nature.
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). In the third-party context a
claim is made on the insurer, not because of the claimant's relationship with the insurer,
(typically there is no privity of contract between the claimant and the insurer in the thirdparty situation), but because the insurer's insured (the tortfeasor) owes a duty to the
claimant. Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967). In such cases
the insurer owes no duty to the claimant. Pixton v. State Farm, 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1991).
There has been some confusion when, in the third-party context, the
claimant and the tortfeasor are both insureds of the same insurer. In these situations, the
third-party claimant will often attempt to use his relationship with the insurer to
characterize the claim as first-party in nature. Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah
1999). In such cases, the position of the claimant must be evaluated to determine whether
the claim is a first-party claim or a third-party claim. Id.
In Sperry, the plaintiffs son was killed in an automobile accident involving
a vehicle driven her husband. At the time of the accident, plaintiff and her husband were
both insured by AMCO Insurance Company ("AMCO"). After the accident, plaintiff
filed a claim with AMCO against her husband for the wrongful death of their son.
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AMCO offered to settle the claim for less than the policy limit. The plaintiff rejected the
offer and later brought a wrongful death action against her husband. In the same action
plaintiff also asserted causes of action against AMCO for bad faith and misrepresentation.
Among other damages, plaintiff sought punitive damages against AMCO. Id. at 382.
AMCO filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims asserting that plaintiff
was a third-party claimant and, as such, could not maintain bad faith and misrepresentation claims against it. The district court granted AMCO's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff subsequently settled the wrongful death action against her husband but then
appealed the district court's dismissal of her causes of action against AMCO for bad faith
and misrepresentation. Id. at 383.
On appeal this Court addressed whether plaintiff was a first or third party in
the context of her claims against AMCO. The Court noted that "whether a named insured
is a first or third party, when asserting a liability claim against a co-insured, is an issue of
first impression in Utah." Id. This Court held that because the plaintiffs claim was
based on her husband's alleged negligence, and not upon her own coverage under the
policy, she must be considered a third-party claimant. Id. at 384.
Since the filing of his original claim with Allstate, to his request that the
District Court renew his action against Allstate, Black has consistently asserted that as a
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result of Gallagher's negligence Allstate had a duty to settle Black's claim. Black went
into great detail about Gallagher's conduct and negligence in the memorandum submitted
in support of Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Furthermore, in the Brief
submitted to this Court Black's "Statement of Facts" addresses only his automobile
accident with Gallagher and why, based on Gallagher's negligence, Allstate should have
settled Black's claim.2 Thus, as this Court found in Sperry under a very similar situation,
Black's claim against Allstate is third-party in nature and the District Court's
determination that Black was a third-party claimant to Allstate was correct.3

2

In an apparent effort to lend some credibility to the argument that Black's claim
is first- party in nature Black vaguely asserts that Allstate had a duty to defend Black.
While the duty of an insurer includes the duty to defend an insured, there was no action
by Gallagher against Black. Furthermore, had there been such an action it would not
change the nature of Black's claim against Allstate.
3

Black also seems to suggest that Allstate denied his claim because of a difference
in the insurance coverages available to Black and Gallagher. While there was a
difference in coverages, there is no evidence to support the assertion that this had any
effect on Allstate's decision in the case. The investigating police officer cited both Black
and Gallagher for the accident. In fact, until the conclusion of the bench trial the District
Court was unable conclude that Gallagher was at fault for the accident, as evidenced by
its refusal to grant Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Finally, insurance
coverages are often different in situations where an insurer is required to evaluate claims
filed by one insured against a co-insured. In such cases an insurer is forced into a
difficult position if it is required to treat the insured claimant differently that other thirdparty claimants, as this Court recognized in Sperry
13

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
ALLSTATE WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE BLACK IS A THIRD-PARTY
CLAIMANT.
On pages 12 and 13 of Black's Brief, Black asserts that he is unaware of
any legal precedent in Utah, or language from the insurance policy that addresses his
ability to sue Allstate directly in the context of this case. He then argues that the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Allstate.
As pointed out to the District Court during the briefing and argument (R. at
444) on Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment and on Black's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, in Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999) this Court held that in
cases where the claimant and the tortfeasor are insureds of the same insurer, if the claim
is based on the negligence of the tortfeasor, the claim should be considered third-party in
nature. Consistent with well-established Utah law, in such cases a direct cause of action
by the third-party claimant against the tortfeasor's insurer cannot be maintained as a
matter of law. M, Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967), Pixton
v. State Farm, 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). This is true even if the tortfeasor's
insurer is also the claimant's insurer. Sperry at 384.
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Furthermore, in spite of Black's assertions to the contrary, the terms of
Gallagher's insurance contract with Allstate4 precludes third-parties from maintaining
direct actions against Allstate to determine legal responsibility for an automobile
accident. Moreover, the policy allows Allstate to settle claims against its insureds filed
by third-parties. (R. at 34 - 35.) Accordingly, by the insurance contract and by Utah law,
a third-party claimant such as Black cannot bring a first-party action against Allstate.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ALLSTATE
"WITH PREJUDICE51 WAS APPROPRIATE.
Black also argues that the summary judgment in favor of Allstate was
improper because it was granted with prejudice. Black asserts that the judgment should
have been without prejudice so that, depending on the outcome of his trial with Gallagher,
and after Gallagher was found to be at fault for the accident, he could pursue his claim
against Allstate.
The very fact that Black bases his ability to maintain a claim against Allstate
on a finding that Gallagher was at fault for the accident underscores the conclusion that
Black's claim against Allstate is a third-party claim. This is true now and it was true when

4

Black's insurance policy contains the same language.
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the District Court evaluated Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment. The nature of
Black's claim has never changed. By this Court's analysis in Sperry, Black cannot
maintain a direct cause of action against Allstate, as a matter of law, at any time.
Accordingly, the District Court's Order granting Allstate summary judgment with
prejudice was proper.
POINT IV
THE DENIAL OF BLACK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS NOT A FINAL JUDGMENT FROM WHICH AN APPEAL CAN BE MADE,
AND THE BENCH TRIAL JUDGMENT RENDERS THE ISSUE OF
GALLAGHER'S FAULT MOOT IN ANY EVENT.
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that an appeal may
be taken from a district court to an appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal "from
all final orders and judgments . . . ." In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538
(Utah 1979) this Court held that "[a] judgment is final when it ends the controversy
between the parties litigant." Id. at 539. In his Brief to this Court, Black argues that the
denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment, which outlined numerous factual assertions
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about his automobile accident with Gallagher5 and demanded that the District Court
summarily find Gallagher at fault for the accident, (R. at 85 - 91), is appealable.
There is no dispute that the controversy between Black and Gallagher
continued after the District Court denied Black's Motion. Furthermore, Black provides no
legal basis which supports his assertion that the denial of a motion for partial summary
judgment can be considered a final judgment from which an appeal can be made. Indeed,
summary judgment motions are often denied and later the party filing the motion prevails
at trial. That does not mean that the District Court improperly denied the motion or that
the denial is appealable. Furthermore, as Black himself acknowledges, the bench trial

5

As can be seen from a cursory review of the memorandum submitted in support
of Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Black demanded that the District Court
summarily determine that Gallagher was solely responsible for this automobile accident
based on several "factual" statements. Contrary to Black's assertion that Allstate did not
dispute these factual statements and that Allstate failed to "controvert any of Black's
alleged undisputed facts," (Black's Brief at p. 13) Allstate disputed "paragraphs 3 through
5 of [Black's] Memorandum and all related subparts of those paragraphs. The fact that
[Black] and defendant Gallagher were in an accident is not in dispute. Facts regarding
who was primarily responsible for the accident and, as Allstate indicated in its
correspondence dated April 13, 1998 to [Black], the apportionment of liability for the
accident is in dispute."
Allstate also pointed out that the investigating police officer determined that both
Black and Gallagher were at fault for the accident and that he cited Black for making an
improper left turn. Finally, Allstate also noted that Gallagher denied fault for the
accident in his Answer to Black's Complaint. (R. at 14-15.)
17

rendered the issue of Gallagher's fault moot, in any event. Accordingly, the denial of
Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is not a final judgment that this Court
should address.
CONCLUSION
By this Court's holding in Sperry v. Sperry, 990 P.2d 381 (Utah 1999),
Black's claim against Allstate is based on the negligence of Gallagher, and thus is thirdparty in nature. Accordingly, the District Court's determination that Black could not
maintain a direct cause of action against Allstate "with prejudice" was correct.
In addition, the denial of Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
not a final judgment as to Gallagher's fault for his accident with Black, and is therefore
not appealable. The bench trial decision rendered the issue of Gallagher's fault for the
accident moot, in any event. Accordingly, this Court should not address the denial of
Black's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Considering the foregoing, Allstate respectfully requests that the District
Court's summary judgment in favor of Allstate be affirmed.
DATED this ^ f c i a y of

, 2003.
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BRANDT MILLER & NELSON

Christian W. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Allstate
Insurance Company
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